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Framing SARS and H5N1 as an Issue of National Security  
in Taiwan: Process, Motivations and Consequences
Vincent Rollet
Introduction
Infectious disease epidemics can be framed in a variety of ways. Indeed, 
they may be considered as a public health and social hygiene issue, as a 
development issue, as a human rights issue, as a risk management issue or as a 
security threat. However it is framed, this has its proponents—and sometimes 
opponents—, its discourses and claims, its modalities and mechanisms of 
response, its objectives as well as direct and indirect consequences. In 2003 
when SARS broke out in Taiwan and in 2005 while avian lu (H5N1) was 
spreading quickly in Asia, Taiwanese authorities decided to consider and 
present both diseases as ‘issues of national security’ and consequently adopted 
responses to these health issues that relected such framing. This article 
proposes to examine how SARS and H5N1 were securitized in Taiwan.
We start with an overview of the global securitizing dynamic of infectious 
diseases which helps to position our study in a broader context and with the 
presentation of our analytical framework inspired by the current international 
academic debate related to such phenomenon. Then, in a second part, we assess 
the process through which speciic public health issues, namely SARS and 
H5N1, became issues of national security in Taiwan by asking the following 
questions: what kinds of actors were the main initiators of this process in Taiwan 
(entrepreneurs of security)? What are their discourses on epidemics, and what 
was the concrete materialization of such framing and its direct consequences 
in terms of epidemic control and prevention? Finally, we underline the factors 
facilitating the securitization of SARS and H5N1 in Taiwan in order to reveal 
what might explain the success of this phenomenon.
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Securitizing infectious diseases: trends and analytical frameworks
Linking infectious diseases to security
In order to position the framing of infectious diseases as a security issue 
in Taiwan in a much wider context, it is worth mentioning that for more than 
20 years, interested by the role that epidemics might play on security—notably 
national security—academics, governments, and international institutions 
have increasingly granted infectious diseases the status of security issues.
At the origin of this process of “securitization” 1 of infectious diseases, 
one inds the development of an “emerging diseases” campaign in the United 
States in the late 1980s. This marks the end of a period of optimism about the 
possibility of the total eradication of infectious diseases worldwide, which had 
been nourished by the discovery of new vaccines and drugs against infective 
agents in the irst part of the 20th century. 2 While HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis C 
and E. coli 0157: H7 had already emerged, this campaign gained in both 
visibility and in scientiic authority thanks to the participation of two of its 
principal leaders, namely Stephen Morse, a virologist, and Joshua Lederberg, 
a geneticist and microbiologist, and to the publication of the 1992 Institute 
of Medicine (IOM) report entitled Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats 
to Health in the United States which is considered to have been particularly 
inluential on scientiic, political and public perceptions of health and security 
in America in the 1990s’. 3 Indeed, after conceptualizing the notion of 
“emerging diseases” and describing the global and microbial causes of disease 
emergence, the report emphasizes the consequences of such phenomena, 
notably in terms of national and global security. The report’s main objective 
was to convince security experts and decision-makers that infectious diseases 
had not disappeared and to support their recommendation in various domains 
of intervention, namely surveillance, training and research, vaccine and drug 
development, and behavioral change. 4
The report was considered as conclusive for many, and the emerging diseases 
movement’s approach rapidly spread through the scientiic, public health and 
medical communities and succeeded in convincing policy and decision makers, 
security experts, journalists in the United-States and worldwide as well as 
international organizations such as the WHO. 5 This network of individuals 
1. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 25.
2. Zylberman 2013: 43-79.
3. King 2004: 66.
4. King 2004: 67.
5. Davies 2008: 297.
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and institutions thus played the role of the institutional relay of a scientiic 
vision considering the rise of “emerging infections” as a problem and linking 
this issue to national and global security. This “emerging diseases worldview” 6 
culminated in terms of international visibility and acceptance when the UN 
Security Council addressed the issue of HIV/AIDS in 2000, and adopted—
despite initial opposition from Russia, China and France—Resolution 1308 
acknowledging the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on security. 7
Outbreaks of SARS in 2003 and the threat of H5N1 since 1997 strengthened 
the inluence of the approach worldwide and convinced countries such as 
Australia, Canada, 8 Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines 9 as well as 
regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 10 to grant emerging diseases the status of 
a ‘security issue’. Simultaneously, epistemic communities produced a growing 
number of scientiic books and articles, and developed research programs to 
conceptualize and illustrate the link between such diseases and security, 11 with 
the aim of helping decision-makers deine the problem and identify policy 
solutions.
Two other important dynamics have been shaped by, and then incorporated 
into the “emerging diseases worldview.” First, the US government had been 
examining the biosecurity response to a possible anthrax or smallpox attack 
since the late 1990s, and this mobilization intensiied in the aftermath of 9/11. 
The local/national consequences of global health and biological events came 
under the spotlight, reinforcing the idea that assisting other countries to face 
health-related challenges was in the US national interest. It also highlighted 
the threat posed to national security by international transportation and trade 
potentially facilitating the rapid spread of infectious diseases in a globalized 
world. 12
The second dynamic is the debate on the impact of infectious diseases 
on human security. This started with the publication of the 1994 United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report which 
considered that challenges such as global infectious diseases were “critical 
6. King 2002: 767.
7. UN Security Council 2000.
8. Davies 2008: 299.
9. Caballero-Anthony 2006.
10. Caballero-Anthony 2008.
11. Among the most representative contributions of such dynamic: CBACI/CSIS 2000; 
International Crisis Group (ICG) 2001; Chalk 2001; Fidler, Price-Smith, Heymann 
2003; IFRI 2005; Garrett 2005; McInnes 2006; Elbe 2007.
12. King 2004: 75-76
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pervasive threats to human security,” notably because they jeopardize health 
security as well as many other components of the human security agenda such 
as economic security, food security and community security. 13 This people-
centered approach to security (human security) in the domain of health, as 
opposed to a state-centered approach (national security), 14 reassured those who 
had agreed to consider “emerging diseases” as a security issue but who were 
suspicious of the narrow focus on national security
Assessing the securitization process for infectious diseases
With the aim of determining how and when a speciic issue becomes a 
security issue, securitization theorists in the ield of International Relations 
proposed to “explore the logic of security itself to ind out what differentiates 
security […] from what is merely political.” 15 They then concentrated their 
efforts in assessing the securitization process or the process by which an 
issue is presented as “an existential threat with a saliency suficient to have 
substantial political effects.” 16 Most of these scholars agreed that ive main 
elements determine a securitization process.
1) The securitizing actors who frame an issue as a security issue. These 
‘entrepreneurs of security’are generally perceived as “accepted voices of 
security, by having the power to deine security” 17 and while it is not always 
the case, are often government oficials, political leaders or lobby groups.
2) They produce a securitizing discourse presenting the speciic issue as 
an existential threat. The word “security” per se may or may not be used by 
securitizing actors, but arguments to frame the issue as a threat will be critical.
3) A referent object is designated as the potential victim of such an 
existential threat. 18 This referent object may be the State (national security) 19 
or, thanks to the vertical enlargement of the concept of security, it could also be 
the World (global security), a region (regional security) or individuals (human 
security).
13. UNDP 1994
14. Lakoff 2008: 106
15. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 4-5.
16. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 25.
17. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 31.
18. Waever 1995: 48.
19. Waever 1995: 48.
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4) Exceptional measures, different from measures taken in the context 
of the routine political management of a non-securitized issue, are actually 
implemented (and not mere rhetoric).
5) Securitization also depends on whether the audience toward which the 
securitizing discourse is directed, accepts, refuses or resists the issue being 
framed in this way. 20 As some scholars have underlined: “Security (as with all 
politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among 
the subjects.” 21 Securitization theorists require the effective implementation of 
exceptional measures and the acceptance of the targeted audience as concrete 
elements of the securitization process. If no sign of acceptance is found among 
the targeted audience, they prefer to talk about securitizing moves. 22
Therefore, the process of securitizing a speciic issue relies irst on “speech 
acts” 23 or statements that have performative functions: a securitizing actor 
declares that a speciic issue represents an existential threat toward a referent 
object and that, in the context, it is required to adopt exceptional measures. 
Then, only if the discourse is accepted by the targeted audience and materialized 
into concrete exceptional measures, is it possible to consider the securitization 
of the speciic issue as tangible.
This securitization process has facilitating conditions 24 if the speech act is 
produced by an actor possessing a position of authority to talk about security 
and when the issue is considered threatening. 25 Political legitimacy; the desire 
to strengthen control on society, notably in non-democratic countries 26; the 
will to retain authority and privilege, 27 as well as pressures from international 
and/or domestic spheres 28 may represent strong incentives to frame a speciic 
issue as a security issue. The domestic political, social, cultural and economic 
context of the securitizing actor as well as their position within the international 
community at that time may inluence such a process. 29
Simultaneously to this international relations framework, the securitization 
of infectious diseases has also been studied by anthropologists who positioned 
the securitization of infectious diseases in the long term. Such historical 
20. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 31.
21. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 31.
22. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 25.
23. Searle 1969.
24. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 31-33.
25. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 31-33.
26. Vuori 2008.
27. Davies 2008: 297.
28. Curley and Herington 2011: 162.
29. Baringer and Heitkamp 2011.
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perspective helps, thus, to emphasize similarities and differences between 
the “emerging diseases worldview” and earlier medicine and public health 
ideologies, thereby showing that the link between national security concerns 
and public health is not new. 30 Distinctions are made between “sovereign 
state security” developed in the 17th century and calling for the protection of 
territorial sovereignty against foreign armies, “population security” emerging 
in the 19th century and resting on the idea of protecting the national population 
against domestic threats and, inally, “vital systems security” central to the 
contemporary politics of security in the domain of health, whose objectives 
of protection are the essential structures governing social and economic life. 31 
While an approach to infectious diseases in terms of population security 
generates preventive measures, considering such a health challenge as an issue 
of vital systems security generates preparedness initiatives. 32 However, these 
two types of measures are profoundly different. Developed in the 19th century, 
prevention policy notably relies on an extensive and scientiic understanding of 
speciic infectious diseases and on the probability of contemporary outbreaks. 
In this context, preventive measures which aim to protect the population 
are materialized by public health initiatives or developmental measures 
against poverty. 33 Conversely, preparedness, as an “emergency modality of 
intervention,” 34 deals with generic health events of very low probability and 
uses ictions to reinforce its legitimacy: it is instead materialized by measures 
which aim at addressing vulnerabilities in health infrastructure, such as the 
strengthening of multi-level disease surveillance systems, the development 
of scenario-based exercises, 35 the production of vaccines or the stockpiling 
of medicine. In that way, preparedness measures are implemented with 
the objective of strengthening the capacity of a country to respond to any 
potentially catastrophic biological event. 36
Finally, regarding the outcomes of the contemporary securitization process 
of infectious diseases, positive and negative impacts have been underlined 
in academic literature. Indeed, on the one hand, it has been illustrated that 
securitizing a particular disease may raise the proile of the disease, 37 helps 
30. King 2002.
31. Collier, Lakoff 2006: 2-3.
32. Lakoff 2007: 25.
33. Lakoff 2008: 106.
34. Collier, Lakoff 2013: 14.
35. Lakoff 2008: 404; Zylberman 2013: 145-149.
36. Collier, Lakoff 2008: 17.
37. Davies 2008: 297.
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to mobilize human and inancial resources to a level that other framing would 
not be able to reach and represents a critical approach to responding eficiently 
to epidemics. 38 However, on the other hand, scholars have also pointed out 
that securitizing a disease may divert limited resources to one speciic health 
problem and away from others. It might also run against the preventive 
risk management strategy that is needed to address infectious diseases, by 
stimulating a preference for preparedness measures. Finally, it has also been 
emphasized that such a securitization process contributed to international 
virus-sharing disputes between developing and developed countries, as in the 
case of Indonesia’s decision in December 2006 to cease sharing its H5N1 virus 
samples in the name of national security. 39
In this article, we propose to use both approaches complementarily in 
order to assess the securitization of SARS and H5N1 in Taiwan. Taiwan is an 
interesting case, as the country was very close geographically to the epicenter 
of the SARS and H5N1 outbreaks and, at the time, neither belonged to nor had 
observer status at the WHO. In deconstructing the dynamics of securitization 
of SARS and H5N1 in Taiwan, we intend to shed light on their securitizing 
actors, their referent objects and the rhetoric used to present both diseases as 
existential threats. The objective of this study is also to appreciate the material 
and ideational outcomes of such securitization in terms of exceptional measures 
and of infectious disease management. Finally, this contribution aims to reveal 
the motivations—or facilitating conditions—behind the securitization of these 
two infectious diseases, as well as the cost and beneits of such actions.
Securitization of infectious diseases in Taiwan:  
SARS and H5N1 as case studies
The Taiwanese breeding ground for infectious diseases securitization
In the 1960s, Taiwan, the United-States and the WHO 40 shared the 
optimistic idea that infectious diseases were being increasingly well 
managed. 41 This general conviction, which continued until the beginning of 
the 21st century, was supported by a real decrease in the incidence of infectious 
diseases such as tuberculosis, Japanese encephalis and hepatitis A in Taiwan, 
38. Ramiah 2006: 162.
39. Elbe 2010.
40. Zylberman 2013: chap. 1.




as well as the eradication of bubonic plague (1948), ilariosis (1955), rabies 
(1959), cholera (1964), typhus (no reports of any cases since World War II), 
smallpox (1965), malaria (1965) 42, diphtheria (1981) and poliomyelitis (1985) 
on the island thanks to the progressive reconstruction of the Taiwanese public 
health infrastructure—notably supported by the United States— 43 and the 
implementation of preventive measures. This optimism was further reinforced 
by the recognition of these successes by the international community, 
particularly the United-States (the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 44 and the US Congressional Taiwan Caucus), 45 WHO, 46 APEC 47 
as well as think-tanks such as the Center for International Development at 
Harvard. 48 As an institutional consequence of such conidence in the ight 
against infectious diseases, the network of infectious disease control in Taiwan 
was largely replaced by a disease control system mainly dedicated to chronic 
diseases.
Interestingly, in this context of general optimism in Taiwan, neither HIV/
AIDS which increased from 9 to 5,650 cases between 1984 and 2003 nor the 
augmentation of tuberculosis infecting 15,042 people in 2003 (11,591 cases 
in 1996) convinced the Taiwanese authorities to consider the rise of infectious 
diseases as a problem, even if some scientists started to point out the necessity 
of doing so. 49 However, the Enterovirus 71 (later abbreviated to EV71) crisis in 
1998 changed the situation and represents a turning-point for two main reasons. 
First, with 78 deaths, the EV71 crisis was more visible internationally than 
HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis. As a consequence, foreigners started to criticize 
the oficial response to the crisis and to question the capacity of Taiwan to 
deal with infectious diseases in general. 50 Second, the Taiwan Department of 
Health asked the US CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) for 
assistance in monitoring and controlling the outbreak. 51 After several meetings 
between the delegation and Taiwanese authorities to discuss control measures 
and after criticism by the US CDC on the disorganization of the infectious 
42. Lin and Liu 2010: 183-203.
43. See Michael Liu’s contribution on malaria eradication in Taiwan in this volume.
44. Jacoby 1966: 107-108.
45. US Congress 2001.
46. WHO recruited numerous Taiwanese experts on tuberculosis, malaria and dengue 
fever to work as advisers between 1960 and 1972.
47. APEC 2001: 6.
48. Gallup and Sachs 1998: 6.
49. Huang 1994.
50. CNN 1998.
51. US CDC 1998.
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diseases control system in Taiwan—particularly the lack of autopsies, which 
made it impossible to know whether the victims actually died of the EV71 52— 
some changes indicate the progressive acceptance by the Taiwanese authorities 
of the “emerging diseases view” supported by the CDC.
First, a Taiwan CDC was created on July 1st, 1999 to enhance the 
management of epidemics in Taiwan, and replaced a number of institutions 
charged with disease control: the Bureau of Communicable Disease Control 
(BCDC), the National Quarantine Service (NQS) and the National Institute of 
Preventive Medicine (NIPM), all vividly criticized during the EV71 crisis for 
their lack of coordination.
Second, after 1998, Taiwan reinforced its enterovirus surveillance capacity 
by strengthening its national diseases surveillance structure, until then based 
only on a sentinel surveillance system. Taiwan then developed a website 
version of the notiiable disease surveillance system (1999), a school-based 
surveillance system (2001) and a syndromic surveillance system (2002) which 
conirmed a move to disease surveillance that is a characteristic of preparedness, 
in contrast to other public health methods focusing on the surveillance of 
diagnosed individuals. 53 Taiwanese health authorities also actively started 
epidemiological research and vaccine development with an EV71 prototype 
vaccine, conducted training for health professionals to improve diagnoses, 
cures and preventative methods against enterovirus infection, and encouraged 
behavioral changes such as frequent hand washing.
The second dynamic for infectious diseases securitization in Taiwan is the 
link between biological war, bioterrorism and the (re)-emergence of infectious 
diseases. Concerns in Taiwan about a biological attack started during the Cold 
War in the context of the development of biological weapons in China and was 
still evoked by the Ministry of National Defence in 2000 54 as well as by the 
President of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian 55 and by the director-general of the CDC 
in 2002. 56 Two anthrax attack false alarms in October 2001 took place just one 
month after an anthrax incident in the United States (September 18, 2001). At 
the same time, bioterrorism was at the center of the discussions at the fourth 
emergency high-level National Security Meeting held after the September 11th 
52. CNN 1998.
53. Fearney 2005: 5.
54. Taipei Times: April 13, 2000.
55. Government Information Ofice, Taiwan: 2002. Conditions of the election of Chen 
Shui-bian as President of Taiwan and the tense relationship with China will be 
speciically presented in the third part of this article.
56. Twu Shiing-jer: 2002.
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attacks, was considered by the CDC to be a national defense issue and was the 
topic of numerous academic articles. 57 In the “2002 National Defense Report” 
published by the Ministry of National Defense, a section was dedicated to the 
presentation of a mechanism of epidemic management whose main objective 
was to protect those Taiwanese soldiers considered key for national security 
against any outbreak of infectious diseases. 58
Thus, thanks to progressive acceptance by Taiwanese oficials of the 
“emerging diseases worldview” and the construction of a direct link between 
infectious diseases and national security in the context of the response to 
biological warfare, bioterrorism and outbreaks of infectious diseases within the 
Taiwanese army, a breeding ground was prepared to facilitate the securitization 
of emerging diseases such as SARS and H5N1.
Framing SARS as a national security issue
SARS was irst identiied in China in November 2002 and entered Taiwan 
via a traveler from that country on March 15, 2003. Then the disease spread 
in two stages. During the irst period, from March 15 to April 19, 2003, 78% 
of probable cases were travel-related, 16% occurred in households and among 
social contacts of SARS cases and 6% were hospital-acquired. 59 With the 
support of the US CDC, who sent experts to Taiwan on March 16 following 
a request from the Taiwanese government to the WHO, Taiwanese authorities 
succeeded in containing the epidemic as a irst step. As a symbol of this 
success, the irst International Symposium on SARS was organized in Taipei 
(April 21) and gave the opportunity to the authorities to share their victory with 
representatives from the international community. However, ironically, on 
the day after the event, the epidemiological situation worsened following the 
misdiagnosis of a patient infected with SARS at the Taipei Municipal Hoping 
Hospital. 60 From that day (April 22) to the end of May, with seven outbreaks 
of SARS in different medical institutions in northern and southern Taiwan, the 
second phase of the spread of SARS in the country was characterized by the 
fact that 89% of cases were hospital-acquired, 9% travel-related and only 2% 
community-acquired. 61 On April 27, Taiwan had its irst SARS fatality, while 
the total number of SARS cases reached 339. On May 3, the WHO decided 
57. For example: Kuo, Chuang 2002; Lin, Wang 2002.
58. Ministry of National Defense 2003: 318-320.
59. WHO/CDS/GSR/GAR 2003: 23.
60. Predecessor of the Taipei City Hospital’s Heping Fuyou Branch.
61. WHO/CDS/GSR/GAR 2003: 23.
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to send two experts to Taipei. After the implementation of various epidemic 
control measures, the spread of SARS was inally halted at the beginning of 
June 2003 after more than 600 Taiwanese had been infected by the disease 
since its arrival in the country. The outbreak killed 81 people. After containing 
what has been called the “Chinese syndrome” or the “21st century’s irst great 
epidemic,” 62 Taiwan was inally declared a “Sars-free zone” by the WHO on 
July 5.
In Taiwan, the process of securitizing SARS started very quickly after the 
announcement of the irst case in the country. Among the main actors of this 
social construct, President Chen Shui-bian was certainly one of the irst to 
securitize SARS publically. Indeed, in early April 2003, during his opening 
remarks to the International Seminar on Asia-Paciic Cooperative Security, 
President Chen stated that SARS should be considered “with the same urgency 
applied to the defense of national security.” 63 Then after April 21, with the 
growing number of SARS cases in the country, the disease obtained the oficial 
status of an issue of national security. A few days after the irst SARS-related 
death in Taiwan, President Chen convened a ‘High-Level National Security 
Meeting on SARS’on May 1, 2003. During this meeting, he announced a 
number of policies with the intention of defending what was then considered 
a major potential victim of a SARS epidemic, namely the State. The measures 
related to epidemic control, public morality, industrial and economic ties 
between Taiwan and China, and wider international cooperation. 64 Indeed, 
while protecting the health of the general population was mentioned during the 
meeting, the main objective of the measures adopted was to protect the State 
and more precisely the key infrastructure, critical to maintaining economic 
and political order, notably by assisting industries seriously affected by SARS, 
reducing panic among the public through transparent communication and 
strengthening the capacity of hospitals to deal with the disease. Simultaneously, 
in a context of international concern over Taiwan’s response to SARS, 65 
control measures recommended by WHO and US CDC teams during their visit 
to Taiwan were scrupulously implemented by Taiwanese health authorities. 
Thus, health authorities closed all SARS-affected health-care facilities to 
new admissions, restricted visiting to the affected facilities and implemented 
universal temperature screening and monitored staff absences. They also 
asked that patients discharged from such facilities during the incubation period 
62. Greenfeld 2007.
63. Ofice of the President, ROC (Taiwan) April 4, 2003.
64. Ofice of the President, ROC (Taiwan) May 1, 2003.
65. Taipei Times May 11, 2003; BBC News May 18, 2003.
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should be notiied of the need for fever monitoring, restricted the transfer of 
patients between health-care facilities and assembled Taiwan CDC teams to 
conduct on-site investigations.
Furthermore, health authorities reinforced the national epidemiological 
surveillance of SARS by granting it notiiable disease status, ran public 
campaigns to accelerate the diagnosis and reporting of people showing 
symptoms. They also raised public awareness of respiratory hygiene and 
appropriate health-seeking behavior in cases of a persistent fever and/or a dry 
cough, implemented exit screening at air, land and sea borders and issue health 
advice in writing to departing passengers. 66 Methods recommended by the 
WHO but whose effectiveness were unproven were also implemented, such as 
the closure of department stores. 67
The unprecedented Presidential initiative which oficially granted SARS 
the status of a national security issue also stimulated several exceptional 
measures aimed at responding to what was then considered an existential threat 
to Taiwan’s national security. A special NT$ 50 billion (€ 1.25 billion) budget 
supporting the country’s anti-SARS campaign was approved by the Legislative 
Yuan: it was the irst time that such a giant budget plan had cleared the legislative 
loor (and in only eight days of debate). 68 The money was mainly dedicated to 
strengthening Taiwan’s preparedness capacity: a very small amount directly 
targeted the “security of the population.” NT$ 29.8 billion (€ 745 million) 
was injected for SARS-preparedness efforts and related medical expenses 
and NT$ 20.2 billion (€ 505 million) to combat the economic impact of the 
outbreak. Within this budget, NT$ 2 billion (€ 50 million) was reserved for 
the National Science Council to conduct medical research into the disease, 
including the development of vaccines and other medicines. The exceptionality 
of such initiative is also manifest when its total budget is compared to the 
NT$ 3 billion reserved for the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS, which 
then infected around 6,000 people. 69
Another illustration of these exceptional measures is without doubt the 
oficial decision to use quarantine as a public health tool to prevent infectious 
diseases, notably because other preventive interventions (e.g., vaccines and 
antibiotics) were unavailable. Indeed, after March 18, anyone who had been 
in close contact with a SARS patient was quarantined for 10-14 days. At the 
end of April, in response to the growing epidemic, Taiwan health authorities 
66. Twu 2003; WHO 2004.
67. Taipei Times May 18, 2003.
68. Taipei Times May 23, 2003
69. Taiwan CDC 2003.
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implemented a more widespread use of quarantine and by the end of the 
health crisis, 131,132 people had been quarantined in Taiwan. 70 People under 
quarantine were required to stay in the immediate locality to where they were 
diagnosed, monitor their temperature, and seek medical attention if they had 
fever or other respiratory symptoms. There were various levels of coninement, 
and depending on these, sufferers could leave quarantine only for activities 
authorized by the local health authorities such as seeking medical attention, 
exercising outdoors and purchasing food. They were not allowed to use public 
transport, visit hospital patients, or crowded public places and had to wear 
surgical masks when around other people and when outside the quarantine site. 
The high-security aspect of such measures was reinforced by the introduction 
of a ine of between US$ 1,765 and US $8,824 and the risk of incarceration of 
up to 2 years in cases of non-compliance with quarantine regulations including 
submitting incomplete SARS survey forms or inaccurate contact information. 
Police oficers were stationed outside the quarantine facilities in order to ensure 
compliance. Little sign of resistance to these measures was noted, with only 
286 people (0.2% of those quarantined) being ined for quarantine violations. 71 
Taiwan was one of several countries that implemented quarantine measures 
during the global SARS outbreak. Not only do such initiatives, which clearly 
demonstrate state power in time of crisis 72 remain extraordinary in the sense 
that they place “limitations on otherwise inviolable rights,” 73 namely the 
freedom of movement in a democracy such as Taiwan, they are also generally 
considered as an archaic method of protecting public health. 74
Parallel to the exceptional measures detailed above, other atypical and 
smaller scale initiatives have also fed into the impression of a close and direct 
link between SARS and Taiwan’s national security, notably due to their nature 
or the resources they mobilized. Among these measures, one can mention the 
mobilization of 1000 soldiers, 150 members of the military police, as well as 
55 special military vehicles used for disinfection by the Taiwan Ministry of 
National Defense in order to help the country control the spread of SARS. 75 
The Ministry of National Defense’s interventions on the epidemic were closely 
followed by the Taiwanese media through the 24 hour TV news programs and 
the print media. The government chose the military-run Institute of Preventive 
70. US CDC 2003.
71. US CDC 2003.
72. Tseng, Wu 2010: 267.
73. Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 24.
74. Zylberman 2013: 396.
75. Taipei Times May 30, 2003; Taiwan Governmental Information Ofice (GIO) 2005.
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Medical Research to develop a vaccine against SARS 76 and the Songshan 
Armed Forces Hospital (afiliated to the Ministry of National Defense) became 
the irst hospital devoted to treating and caring for SARS patients. 77 At that 
time, the TV news and newspaper pictures showing military-uniformed nurses 
caring for SARS patients were reminiscent of those seen in times of war.
Finally, to illustrate this securitizing environment, one could certainly 
mention the daily televised Taiwan Department of Health press conferences, 
similar to those organized by the US and UK military forces during the Iraq war 
which occurred around the same time. During these routine events, measures 
taken by the government were presented as the weapons in a “war against the 
enemy” (Yichang duikang diren zhanzheng).
The securitization of SARS in Taiwan relied on the fact that the President 
and government of Taiwan (securitizing actors) presented SARS to the public 
as an existential threat to national security—notably to vital systems security—
(referent object) and concluded that the situation necessitated strong action 
(exceptional measures) in order to prevent and contain the disease. These 
extraordinary measures were truly and sustainably implemented and largely 
accepted by the target audiences, namely the members of the Legislative Yuan 
for the approval of the special SARS budget, and the citizens who had been 
in close contact with SARS patients for the quarantine. The securitization of 
SARS also reveals the increasing prominence given to “emerging diseases” 
by Taiwanese government oficials and, in the light of the control and the 
preparedness measures taken in response to the disease, it also conirms the 
progressive acceptation in Taiwan of the “emerging diseases worldview” 
promoted by the US and the WHO. As we will now see, these two dynamics 
were ampliied by the securitization of H5N1.
Granting H5N1 national security issue status
With the exception of Brunei, Singapore and the Philippines, all Taiwan’s 
neighbors have been affected by H5N1 since 2003 and at least nine Asian 
countries have reported human cases of the virus. However in Taiwan no 
human cases of H5N1 have been identiied so far, even though the country 
possesses very close trade and touristic relations with most of the infected 
countries in Asia.
Nevertheless, the possibility of an H5N1 outbreak in Taiwan has not been 
ignored by health authorities. As an illustration, in March 2005, 42 deaths 
76. Taipei Times May, 14 2003.
77. Chou 2010.
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attributed to H5N1 in neighboring countries prompted the Taiwan CDC to 
declare that “a bird-lu epidemic is (just) a matter of time” 78 and, in March 2006, 
when an H5N1-related death was reported in Southern China, the Department 
of Health (DOH) chief Hou Sheng-mou declared that “the threat of bird lu is 
approaching the gates of Taiwan.” 79
Taiwanese health authorities continued to promulgate this alarming 
message 80 which at one and the same time raises the potential of an H5N1 
outbreak in Taiwan and proclaims the fact that there had been no human cases 
of H5N1 in the country due to the efforts of the health authorities.
In such a context, H5N1 was considered a security issue in Taiwan from 
August 19, 2005, when President Chen Shui-bian convened a new National 
Security Council meeting to discuss a prospective analysis published by the 
US CDC predicting 14,000 Taiwanese deaths in the event of an H5N1 outbreak 
and calling for stronger preparedness measures. 81 On October 31, 2005 and 
March 9, 2006, President Chen convened the second and third High-Level 
National Security Council meetings on avian lu, which he described as “a 
serious threat to both social stability and national security.” 82 He explained in 
2006, during a videoconference with European oficials:
My administration attaches great importance to the prevention of avian lu. I 
personally convened a high-ranking national security conference in August 2005 to 
discuss issues related to avian lu. Since then, we have convened two more national 
security conferences to discuss this important issue, which is to say, that the Taiwan 
government has upgraded the issue of avian lu epidemic prevention and control to 
the national security level. 83
In its ‘Strategy plan for the execution of an inluenza pandemic response,’ the 
Department of Health classiied avian lu as “a non-traditional security threat” 
and warned that an outbreak of H5N1 would not only represent a catastrophe 
for public health and for the agricultural sector, but also “a great threat to social 
stability and national security.” 84 Moreover, Council of Agriculture (COA) 
Chairman Lee Chin-lung underlined that “avian lu control has been raised to 
78. Taipei Times March 12, 2005.
79. China Post March 11, 2006.
80. Taipei Times January 11, 2006.
81. Taipei Times August 19, 2005.
82. Taipei Times November 1, 2005.
83. Ofice of the President, ROC (Taiwan) May 19, 2006.
84. Taiwan CDC 2012a: 152.
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a national security level” 85 and the representative to the European Union and 
Belgium and former senior advisor of the National Security Council, Michael 
Kau Ying-mao, explained that “our experience with SARS a few years ago 
helped us to learn how to manage a public health emergency and we consider 
avian lu as a threat to national security.” 86
The decision to respond to the potential spread of H5N1 as a national 
security issue engendered several preparedness measures aimed at protecting 
Taiwan’s “vital infrastructure.” Indeed, as for SARS, a special and impressive 
budget of NT$ 30 billion (€ 751 million) supporting avian inluenza control 
measures was accepted without any disagreement from the opposition-
dominated Legislative Yuan. 87 While concerns about a potential outbreak of 
H5N1 in Taiwan certainly motivated such immediate support from the Yuan, 
the fact that the government also argued for the budget on its multi-disease 
coverage and “dual-use”—as it would simultaneously help to strengthen 
Taiwan’s response to bioterrorism—certainly helped convince the Yuan that 
even if there was no H5N1 outbreak in Taiwan, the budget wouldn’t be a waste 
of money. To appreciate the exceptionality of such a inancial initiative, it might 
be revealing to highlight that in 2005 the DOH invested NT$ 416 million in 
cancer prevention, the leading cause of death in Taiwan since 1982. 88
After the inclusion of H5N1 as a notiiable disease in Taiwan 
(December 2004) and the adoption of the H5N1 budget, preparedness measures 
recommended by the WHO and the US CDC were strictly implemented in 
Taiwan within the framework of the ive-year National Inluenza Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan (2005). Systems for the surveillance of populous institutions 
and information collection for infectious diseases were added to the national 
disease surveillance system. The capacity of critical structures such as 
hospitals to control nosocomial diseases and avian lu was also strengthened 
through training health professionals and increasing the quality and number of 
negative-pressure isolation rooms. Furthermore, a National Health Command 
Center (NHCC) (Guojia weisheng zhihui zhongxin), largely inspired by the 
US Health Command Center, was created within the Taiwan CDC in 2005 in 
order to unify the national response to major man-made and natural epidemics.
Fruit of some exceptional initiatives, stockpiling antivirals was another 
weapon in the Taiwanese preparedness arsenal against H5N1. Indeed, in 
October 2005, Taiwan had enough Tamilu to cover only 4% of the population 
85. Taipei Times November 19, 2005.
86. The Parliament Magazine April 9, 2007.
87. Chiang 2005.
88. Bureau of Health Promotion, DOH 2005.
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at a time when the WHO recommended coverage of such a stockpile should 
be 10%. As the government was concerned about Roche’s effective production 
and dispensing capacity of at a time of global pandemic, the DOH sent a 
request to the Swiss company—then the only producer of such an antiviral—
for a secondary license allowing Taiwanese private companies working with 
the National Health Research Institute to mass-produce Tamilu to increase the 
country’s stockpiles as a precautionary measure against a potential avian lu 
pandemic. 89 Having not received a positive answer from Roche and in order to 
prove both domestically and internationally that Taiwan was able to produce 
such a drug, the DOH, which had one month earlier asked the Taiwan National 
Health Research Institute (NHRI) to evaluate the possibility of producing 
Tamilu in small quantities, announced on October 18, 2005 that Taiwan was 
able to develop a generic version of Tamilu which was 99.9% identical to 
Tamilu. 90 During the second national security meeting on avian lu, 91 the 
President of Taiwan declared the making and stockpiling of antiviral drugs 
to be ‘the work of utmost important regarding the disease’. One day later, on 
November 1, the DOH submitted an application for a compulsory license 92 
to the Taiwan Intellectual Property Ofice (IPO) to obtain the authorization 
to manufacture a generic version of Tamilu locally without the consent of 
the patent holder, as is allowed under WTO regulations in the context of 
medical emergencies. 93 While waiting for answers from the IPO and from 
Roche, the DOH decided to purchase three tons of shikimic acid, a product 
made in China essential in the manufacture of Tamilu. 94 Finally, at the end 
of November 2005, Roche had still not answered the Taiwan DOH’s request, 
and after receiving the authorization from the IPO, Taiwan health authorities 
decided to use the “compulsory license” in order to produce their generic 
Tamilu and reach the recommended coverage level of 10% of the population. 
However, in order to prevent damage to Taiwan’s image in the protection of 
intellectual property rights, the authorization to manufacture this anti-viral 
drug without the consent of Roche was only accepted by the IPO under several 
89. China Post October 18, 2005.
90. Taipei Times October 18, 2005.
91. Taiwan Governmental Information Ofice (GIO) 2005b
92. According to the World Trade Organization, compulsory licensing is when a government 
allows someone else to produce the patented product or process without the consent of 
the patent owner. It is one of the lexibilities on patent protection included in the WTO 
agreement on intellectual property—the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) Agreement.
93. China Post November 1, 2005.
94. Asia Times October 29, 2005.
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conditions. The compulsory license was limited to domestic use and effective 
to the end of 2007. Furthermore, Taiwan could only start production of Tamilu 
when its stocks and those ordered from Roche were depleted. 95 In fact, Roche 
provided Taiwan with additional doses of the anti-viral in 2006, which allowed 
the country to cover 2.3 million people (10% of the whole population). By the 
end of 2007, Taiwan was free of H5N1; it thus did not need the Tamilu that 
the government had in its stock, and local mass-production of a generic version 
of Tamilu was never launched. It is noteworthy that the decision to issue a 
compulsory license for Tamilu is exceptional. Taiwan was the irst country to 
have employed such a mechanism to ensure suficient stockpiles of the drug in 
case of a pandemic.
Consistent with the preparedness approach, which in contrast with classic 
public health uses imaginative techniques to simulate potential health threats, 
the Taiwanese government also conducted table-top exercises based on various 
catastrophic scenarios in order to reveal and address weaknesses in its critical 
infrastructure. 96 Thus, major lu epidemic training exercises were held in 
Pingtung County by the CDC in 2006 and 2007 in conjunction with the Wan-
Ann Military Exercise organized by the Ministry of National Defense and 
within the framework of a cooperation agreement between that Ministry and 
the CDC. The CDC also organized the “Egret Number 1” lu-exercise to test 
the off-shore medical care system based on serious H5N1 inluenza pandemic 
scenarios with high fatality levels. 97
Similarly to what had occurred during the SARS episode, the above events 
conirmed the H5N1securitization process. Indeed, this virus—for which there 
were no human cases reported in Taiwan—had been considered and presented 
as an existential threat to national security—more precisely to Taiwan’s vital 
systems security—by the Taiwanese authorities who consequently decided 
and implemented, without domestic resistance, exceptional preparedness 
initiatives.
Facilitating conditions and consequences of the securitization process of 
SARS and H5N1 in Taiwan
Facilitating conditions: domestic politics and international factors
95. Taipei Times November 26, 2005.
96. Collier and Lakoff 2013: 14.
97. Taiwan CDC 2007: 47.
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Securitization theorists use the term facilitating conditions for factors 
explaining the acceptance of a speciic concern as a security issue. Looking 
at such conditions might help us to understand why SARS and H5N1 have 
been securitized while diseases whose morbidity and mortality incidences are 
higher, have never been considered security issues, as well as to appreciate the 
origins and incentives behind such an approach.
While President Chen Shui-Bian was in a position of authority to talk about 
security, as he represented, at that time, the highest authority in Taiwan, other 
factors facilitated the securitization process of these two diseases. Domestic 
politics is one of these factors. In 2000, the election of Chen Shui-bian of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and former mayor of Taipei, ended more 
than ifty years of Kuomingtang (KMT) control of the government whose 
political legitimacy rested notably on its capacity to bring economic prosperity 
to the country through the rapid industrialization and economic growth in the 
1970s and 1980s. During his presidential campaign, Chen Shui-bian promised 
to consolidate Taiwan’s democracy, to ight corruption and to defend fair and 
open social welfare policies, and also pledged to pursue economic development 
and to raise Taiwan’s economic competitiveness. This last pledge was often 
ridiculed by the KMT and a survey in 2000 showed that only 12.3% of the 
respondents considered that Chen was the most competent candidate to deal 
with economic growth while the KMT candidate, Lien Chan, reached 35.7%. 
In other words, although legitimated by the ballot box through universal 
suffrage, Chen and his government had also to gain political legitimacy 
through economic growth. Before SARS broke out in Taiwan on 22 April 
2003, Chen Shui-bian’s government had actually been successful in keeping 
to its economic objectives, as Taiwan’s economic growth had reached 3.54% 
(-2,1% in 2001, 3.2% in 2002) making Taiwan the second-fastest growing of 
Asia’s dragon economies after South Korea. 98 Furthermore, Chen Shui-bian 
and the DPP were already involved in the campaign for the next presidential 
election, which would be held eleven months later (March 20, 2004). In this 
political context, with SARS cases being reported in Taiwan and economic 
forecasts revealing that the outbreak could damage the whole economy 99 and 
tarnish his presidential mandate, Chen Shui-bian decided to grant this speciic 
health issue the status of an issue of national security. This was also intended 
to inluence the 44.1% of voters in 2000 who still thought that he was not 
the most competent person to deal with the issue of economic growth. 100 In 
98. Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) 2003: 4
99. Taipei Times April 26, 2003; Taipei Times April 29, 2003; Taipei Times April 30, 2003.
100. Niou and Paolino 2003: 726.
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other words, political legitimacy and electoral strategy also motivated the 
securitization of SARS.
Similarly, domestic politics also played a facilitating role in securitizing 
H5N1. In August 2005, when H5N1 had been oficially granted the status of an 
issue of national security, Chen Shui-bian had also been reelected—by less than 
30,000 votes—and while the global economy had entered a phase of slower 
growth, Taiwan’s economy remained on a path of stable growth reaching an 
annual rate of 4.1%. 101 The DPP government had thus proved that it was able 
to provide sustainable economic growth in Taiwan as Chen had promised in 
2000 and repeated during the 2004 presidential campaign. However, at that 
time, Chen and his government knew that the forthcoming local elections 
(December 2005) would be a real test for them as the rate of unemployment 
was rising and a series of scandals had tarnished the DPP’s image. The threat 
of the outbreak of a disease devastating Taiwan’s economy—as was forecast 
by numerous economists in Taiwan and abroad—led Chen and his government 
to take exceptional measures, showing their determination to protect Taiwan’s 
vital infrastructure and people against this potential pandemic and at the same 
time reassuring the voters about the eficiency of their policies. The only 
mechanism which could allow the rapid acceptance by the Legislative Yuan 
and the implementation of such initiatives was to make H5N1 an issue of 
national security. In other words, even though the DPP was later replaced by 
the KMT as the largest party at a local level, securitizing H5N1 during the 
post-election period was an electoral strategy by the government with the aim 
of strengthening its image of being in control of the situation and convincing 
voters to support its candidates in the local elections.
International politics, characterized by the will to clearly differentiate 
Taiwan from China (PRC), has also played a crucial role in this dynamic. 
Furthermore, considering pandemics as threats and not as risks, amounted to 
attributing the responsibility of such a health event to an identiiable source 
and not to consider its occurrence as an unintended consequence of global, 
regional or local dynamics. 102 Indeed, SARS was clearly and repeatedly 
identiied as originating from mainland China by Taiwanese authorities. 103 
SARS was presented by President Chen as “an imported disease” from 
China, 104 its presence in Taiwan as similar to the existence of Communist 
101. Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) 2006.
102. Beck 1999; Giddens 1999.
103. Rich 2005: 71-73.
104. Department of Health 2003.
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Chinese spies in the country, according to the DOH, 105 and its occurrence on 
the island was explained by Chen as the direct result of a Communist Chinese 
cover-up of the epidemic. 106 Such identiication of the PRC as the source of 
the disease was repeated in the context of H5N1 when President Chen painted 
China as a “black-hole in the global effort to prevent avian lu” 107 and when 
Mainland Affairs Council Vice-Chairman Liu Te-Shun explicitly stated that 
the lack of transparency in China’s epidemic disease information on H5N1 was 
jeopardizing Taiwan’s disease prevention efforts and was putting the health 
of the Taiwanese people at risk. 108 While this deliberate choice to accuse the 
PRC as the source of both epidemics does not come as a surprise from a pro-
independence president such as Chen Shui-bian or for government oficials 
afiliated to the DPP, it helped to stir Taiwan nationalism both among DPP 
supporters and elsewhere and to reinforce the images of an authoritarian 
PRC versus democratic Taiwan. Interestingly, by contrast, in 2013, the KMT 
government and President Ma Ying-jeou did not frame H7N9 as an issue of 
national security, but as a risk. At the same time the Taiwan Solidarity Union 
(TSU, Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng), a political party advocating Taiwanese 
independence, did express the necessity of doing so. 109
Framing SARS and H5N1 as issues of national security was also a way 
for Taiwan, who was not and still is not a member of the WHO, to reinforce 
its identity at the global level. Indeed, by following this international trend of 
securitizing emerging diseases, by reforming its epidemic control infrastructure 
and developing its strategies in reference to what has been done by the 
US CDC—itself a global institution—and by scrupulously implementing the 
control and preparedness measures recommended by the WHO in response to 
SARS and H5N1, Taiwan has identiied itself as a member of the global health 
security community.
Consequences of the securitization process of SARS and H5N1 in Taiwan
In the case of the securitization of SARS and H5N1 in Taiwan, three main 
and direct consequences of such an approach can be underlined.
First, it had an institutional effect. Indeed, the framing of a health issue as a 
national security issue actually invited the Department of Health—which was 
105. China Post April 1, 2003.
106. BBC News March 30, 2003.
107. Taipei Times March 10, 2006.
108. Taipei Times March 2, 2008.
109. Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 2013.
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then not even a full Ministry – and its afiliated agencies, such as the CDC, to 
play in the yard of “high politics.” This opportunity certainly helped the DOH 
to upgrade its institutional position within the government as well as its power 
relative to other ministries. This helped the DOH in its request to be granted a 
ministerial status and more recently (July 2013) in its expansion to become the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare.
The second important consequence of addressing these emerging diseases 
as an issue of national security and not as an issue of population security is 
the replacement of a logic of prevention for a logic of preparedness, focused 
on safeguarding the security of Taiwan’s vital systems security. In other 
words, SARS and H5N1 have profoundly changed the way Taiwan responds 
to epidemics. The progressive acceptance of the preparedness approach by 
Taiwanese oficials in dealing with epidemics is revealed by the institutional 
health reforms introduced after the 2003 SARS outbreak (creation of a Taiwan 
CDC, strengthening the national epidemiological surveillance system) as well 
as by the measures implemented to keep Taiwan free from H5N1 (training 
health professionals, table-top exercises, stockpiling Tamilu and a vaccine 
research program). This approach was conirmed in the National Inluenza 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan and in the Inluenza Pandemic Strategic Plan 
whose main objectives are according to the CDC, to minimize the death toll, 
economic losses and the impact of new inluenza viruses. 110 Such choices 
raised questions about their consequences in terms of the respect of human 
rights in Taiwan in the case of a major epidemic, given the fact that experience 
in Taiwan and elsewhere reveals how the protection of national security can 
easily be used to legitimate unfair, non-transparent, invasive, punitive and 
forced measures.
The third consequence touches on Taiwan’s foreign policy in relation 
to health. Indeed, following the securitization process of SARS and H5N1, 
Taiwan has implemented several new overseas health initiatives. These have 
been motivated by the idea that the threat to Taiwanese national security 
represented by a pandemic might be attenuated through external activities such 
as epidemic control in the countries where outbreaks of infectious diseases 
have already occurred. 111 Such an approach was coherent with the emerging 
diseases campaign discourse which was convinced that assisting other 
countries to face health-related challenges was in the national/regional interest 
of the helping country/regions. 112 Within the framework of such an approach, 
110. Taiwan CDC 2012b: 35.
111. Rollet 2010.
112. King 2004: 75-76.
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in 2005 Taiwan started to send medical teams—physicians, epidemiologists, 
laboratory scientists, vector control specialists and epidemic investigators—to 
countries where avian lu had occurred, and in doing so brought assistance 
and guidance in epidemic preparedness and control. Thus, Taiwan sent health 
specialists to Burkina Faso and Chad in 2006 to help these two diplomatic 
allies manage H5N1 113 and donated preventive materials (Tamilu and 
protective masks) to Vietnam and Ghana in order to strengthen their H5N1 
prevention capacities. 114 Considering such pre-emptive measures as a success, 
the DOH institutionalized them through the establishment of the Global 
Outbreak Assistance Corps of Taiwan or GOACT (Jingwai fangyi dadui) in 
June 2007, whose main objective is to improve Taiwan’s disease prevention 
capabilities and to pursue the strategy of “epidemic prevention before domestic 
outbreak.” 115 Considered as the main actor in Taiwan’s “preventive diplomacy 
against infectious diseases,” 116 GOACT has since sent its teams worldwide to 
participate in disease prevention operations against infectious diseases (Haiti, 
Indonesia), has closely monitored speciic diseases (H1N1 in Hong Kong, 
China and Mexico) and shared surveillance information with other countries 
(Australia) 117. Such initiatives are not dissimilar to—and have even been 
inspired by 118— the initiatives taken by the US CDC Global Disease Detection 
and Emergency Response Division and the European CDC to monitor 
infectious diseases worldwide and to send epidemiological teams abroad to 
assist foreign countries in outbreak response and preparedness activities with 
the aim of preventing health crises anywhere in the world that might have an 
impact on the United-States or the European Union. 119
Conclusion
In response to outbreaks of SARS and H5N1, the Taiwanese authorities 
decided to consider these two diseases as national security issues, as had been 
done by other countries in the global context of securitizing of infectious 
diseases. Encouraged by its capacity to generate large popular support as well 
113. Taipei Times April 8, 2006; Le Progrès June 14, 2006.
114. Thanh Nien News July 22, 2005; Department of Health 2008: 117
115. Taiwan CDC 2008: 65-68; Department of Health 2008b.
116. Hou 2007.
117. Taiwan CDC 2011: 66-67
118. Taiwan CDC 2008: 65-66
119. US CDC 2012: 4 and 33; ECDC 2006: 8.
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as signiicant funding, the Taiwanese government saw securitization as an 
opportunity to increase awareness in national identity, make electoral gains 
and strengthen political legitimacy at the domestic level as well as enhance 
Taiwan’s national identity at the international level.
The aim of protecting Taiwan’s national security in the context of 
SARS and H5N1 led to the application of exceptional measures, and also 
provoked a profound change in the way epidemics are managed in Taiwan. 
The preparedness measures developed and implemented were very different 
from the preventive measures previously used in the country when faced 
with such health challenges. At the same time, such a change also illustrates 
how an international norm—epidemic preparedness—originating from the 
US and largely promoted worldwide by the US CDC and the WHO has been 
integrated into oficial Taiwanese strategies against epidemics, and then how 
such institutions with global reach inluence health strategies on a national 
level. However, given the narrow focus and the negative consequences such a 
national security approach may have on human rights, inding an alternative 
response to the threat of an epidemic in a democracy such as Taiwan represents 
the next challenge in the domain of epidemic control.
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